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1. Overview 
 The field of administrative law is inextricably bound to two phenomena that trace 
their origins to the nineteenth century:  the rise of large state bureaucracies designed to 
fulfill a complex array of societal needs and the development of liberal democratic norms 
of social organization and public authority.  Much of administrative law can be 
understood as an attempt to work out the tension inherent in these two phenomena:  the 
recognition that the attainment of public purposes is contingent on a cadre of full-time 
employees, paid by the public purse and loyal to the state, and, at the same time, the 
belief that public authority is legitimate only if embedded in democratic politics and 
liberal societies.  To put it more succinctly, these are the objectives, on the one hand, of 
neutrality and expertise, and, on the other hand, of democracy and liberal rights.   
 2 
The common aspiration of making public administration both capable and 
accountable serves as the springboard for the comparative analysis in this chapter.   I 
begin with a discussion of what, in the law, is taken to be the hallmark of modern 
bureaucracy—the legal guarantees of civil service employment—together with national 
variations in the professionalization of administration and contemporary efforts to cut 
back on civil service guarantees.  I then turn to three important types of accountability:  
the contestation of administrative action before the courts, the involvement of organized 
interests in administrative policymaking, and informal accountability to the general 
public through parliamentary ombudsmen and transparency guarantees.  These categories 
serve as a framework for exploring the similarities and differences that shape 
contemporary administrative law systems.  The chapter concludes with the increasingly 
important phenomenon of the globalization of administrative law and the rapid migration 
of administrative principles across legal systems throughout the world, both national and 
international.  In line with the intellectual purpose of this volume, I have omitted topics 
that have traditionally been considered peripheral to the field or that fall at the 
intersection with other disciplines, for instance the constitutional powers of the executive 
branch over public administration and the empowerment of private groups through self-
regulation, and refer the reader to the bibliography at the end of the chapter for guidance.    
 
2. Public Administration 
 One of the defining elements of bureaucracy is civil service employment:  the 
selection and promotion of public officials based on merit and insulated from political 
influence through tenured employment.
1
  The legal guarantees of civil service 
employment emerged to serve multiple ends:  autocratic rulers seeking to consolidate 
their authority (Prussia), political elites adapting the instruments of government to the 
demands of industrialization and urbanization (Britain), and government reformers intent 
on shielding administration from the instability and incompetence of party-patronage 
appointments (France and the United States).   In Europe, Japan, and North America, 
civil service safeguards were introduced over the course of the nineteenth century:  
beginning in the 1840s in France, 1870 in Britain, 1873 in Prussia, 1882 in Canada, 1887 
in Japan, and 1883 in the United States.    
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Modern civil service laws are designed to render public employees independent of 
partisan politics and competent to perform the business of the nation.   Some legal 
systems go so far as to constitutionalize this ambition, including the Italian Constitution 
(Articles 97 and 98) and the German Basic Law (Article 33).  The core features of civil 
service employment are:  (1) life tenure absent grave misconduct; (2) merit-based 
recruitment; (3) promotion based on a mixture of seniority and merit (often accompanied 
by independent civil service commissions); (4) pay scales and benefits that are more 
standardized than in private enterprise; and (5) restrictions on political activity, speech, 
and union activities, although these are far less common now than in the past. 
Notwithstanding the common impulse to develop a professionalized public 
administration, there remain significant differences in the degree to which recruitment is 
professional or political.  At the top echelons of the bureaucracy, political appointments 
are more extensive in the United States than in other countries, on the theory that 
electoral winners should have an opportunity to impose a new set of priorities on 
government administration through the selection of high-level personnel.
2
  There are also 
significant differences in the extent of patronage appointments at the lower levels of the 
bureaucracy.  Some countries appear to be particularly vulnerable to party-based 
infiltration of the public administration, notwithstanding a legal commitment to an 
independent, professionally competent civil service.  Italy represents but one example of 
this phenomenon.
3
  A number of mechanisms, related to the historically weak nature of 
party competition, have enabled political parties and party-affiliated trade unions to 
circumvent the civil service system and carve out the public administration among 
themselves.  These mechanisms include the unofficial assignment of government sectors 
to certain political parties—for instance, in the past, the Ministry of Agriculture to the 
Christian Democrats—and the recruitment of personnel through temporary contracts, 
which are then converted into permanent employment by law or government decree.   
The past twenty years or so have witnessed a number of challenges to the 
traditional model of civil service employment.
4
  The most important is the wave of New 
Public Management reforms that hit most democracies the 1980s.  Reformers in this 
school have sought to render the public sector more efficient by making the terms of 
public sector employment—pay, benefits, and promotion—more flexible and by tying 
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them more closely to performance indicators.   Even more radically, various service 
delivery functions have been taken away from government administration and are now 
handled by firms operating in the private sector.  The scope of these reforms, however, 
varies dramatically.  Privatization, for instance, is far less pervasive in Europe than in the 
United States, where core state functions such as running prisons and conducting military 
operations have been out-sourced to private contractors.
5
       
 
3. Administration and the Courts 
 3.1.  Systems of judicial review 
 With the emergence of bureaucratic power in the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries came the question of justice.  What was to be the relationship between the old 
mode of exercising public authority, through trials and courts, and this new form of state 
power, designed to expeditiously raise taxes, undertake public works, protect public 
health, and more?  The right to contest administrative decisions in a trial-like proceeding 
before a state official removed from the original determination emerged in both civil law 
and common law systems as critical to the legitimacy of administrative authority.  At the 
same time, what is generally understood to be the major difference between 
administrative law systems also took shape:  jurisdiction vested in the ordinary courts in 
England versus litigation before specialized state officials connected to the executive 
branch in France.   
The origins of the common law-droit administratif divide are extremely complex 
and have been the object of numerous distinguished studies.
6
  For our purposes, it is 
enough to recall the very different historical circumstances surrounding the rise of 
bureaucracy and administrative law in France and England.  In France, the drive to 
consolidate absolute authority in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was marked by 
intense conflicts between the royal officers responsible for administering the provinces 
(intendants) and the powerful regional courts in the hands of local elites (Parlements).  In 
an attempt to insulate the decisions of the intendants from interference by the Parlements, 
legal oversight was entrusted to a special body directly controlled by the monarchy 
(Conseil du Roi).  The system of a specialized review body was borrowed during the 
French Revolution, albeit motivated by a very different republican theory aimed at 
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destroying the special privileges and vested interests of the Parlements of the Ancien 
Régime and ensuring that government officials would not encounter resistance from the 
old elites in carrying out the will of the people.  Napoleon, in turn, embraced this system 
with the founding of the Council of State (Conseil d’État).  It was at this time that the 
distinctive French separation of powers doctrine was born, according to which “to judge 
the administration is still to administer” (juger l'administration c'est encore administrer):   
judicial review by the ordinary courts represented an encroachment upon the executive 
power and therefore oversight had to be entrusted to a specialized body connected with 
the executive branch.    
By contrast, in England, the business of government was handled by local elites 
with relatively little central involvement until well into the nineteenth century and 
appeals against government officers were heard by courts of general jurisdiction based on 
the same system of common law writs devised for private disputes.  Although the Stuarts 
made a bid to improve royal control by creating a separate set of prerogative courts with 
jurisdiction over complaints against government officers, the attempt came to end with 
the victory of Parliament and the common law bar in the Revolutionary Settlement of 
1688.  At that time, the hated prerogative courts were abolished and the powers and 
independence of common law judges were formally established by act of Parliament.  
Later, when a substantial, centralized bureaucracy emerged, largely in response to 
nineteenth-century industrialization, the stature of the common law was such that there 
could be no question of ousting the courts and transferring administrative disputes to a 
separate body. 
 Let us explore the common law-droit administratif difference in more detail.  In 
1885, the English scholar Albert Venn Dicey famously proclaimed that in England, 
unlike France, there was no such thing called administrative law.
7
  Government officers 
could be held to account for their actions, like private individuals, before the ordinary 
courts of law.  The same judges, applying the same rules and affording the same rights 
and remedies, had the power to decide both suits against the government and purely 
private disputes.  Dicey argued that by treating public administration and private 
individuals on the same footing, the English system did a better job of safeguarding basic 
liberties and therefore was superior to the French one.   
 6 
This characterization of the English system of legal redress has been rightly 
debunked as inaccurate, not only from the perspective of the law as it has evolved today 
but also at the time it was pronounced.  For instance, the statute of limitations for tort 
actions against public officials was six months, compared to the six years for similar 
actions between private parties, and was only extended by the Law Reform (Limitation of 
Actions) of 1954.  It is true, however, that the practice of common law adjudication did 
produce a marked tendency to deny any categorical difference between public and private 
law and a natural overlapping of legal concepts, writs, and forms of redress between 
cases brought against private parties and those brought against the government.
8
  Today, 
with the elaboration of numerous legal doctrines specific to administration, the creation 
of a specific procedure for judicial review, the widespread resort to administrative 
tribunals (explained below), and the establishment of a special section of the ordinary 
courts devoted to administrative law, it is evident that even in England, administrative 
law is a field apart from private law.  The main vestiges of the original model that have 
survived are to be found in the area of government torts and public contracts, which are 
considered part of the general law of torts and contracts, and in the continuing power of 
common law courts to hear, in the last resort, cases brought against the government. 
 In France, the Council of State (Conseil d’État) was originally established by 
Napoleon. 
9
  Then, as now, the Council of State had the dual function of drafting 
government laws and rules and hearing cases against government administration.  
Originally, the Council of State’s dispute-resolution function was subject to extensive 
limitations, but by the time of the Third Republic most had been abolished and the 
Council of State had become a powerful and respected arbiter of complaints against the 
government.   
 Institutionally, the critical difference between the Council of State and the judicial 
branch is the system of recruitment and management of personnel, which gives rise to 
pronounced cultural and sociological affinities between the Council of State and public 
administration.  Members of the Council of State are selected from graduates of the École 
Nationale d’Administration, the elite, state-run school designed to train the uppermost 
echelons of the civil service (about two-thirds) and from the ranks of experienced 
individuals already serving in the administration, either in the lower administrative courts 
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or in the upper ranks of the civil service (about one-third).  This stands in contrast to the 
judiciary, which is populated with law school graduates who receive professional training 
at the state-sponsored school for the judiciary.  Moreover, at any given point in time, 
about one-third of the members of the Council of State are serving elsewhere in the 
public administration, in ministerial cabinets, public enterprises, and other government 
offices.  The last distinguishing feature of the Council of State is the mix of functions 
performed by its members.  There are five administrative sections, responsible for giving 
technical advice on legislation and regulation, and one adjudicatory section, which hears 
administrative law cases, and members are commonly assigned to both an administrative 
section and the adjudicatory section.  It is also important to underscore what does not 
separate the Council of State from the judicial branch—independence.  True, members of 
the Council of State, unlike the judiciary, are not formally guaranteed permanence in 
office (inamovibilité), which means that in theory they can be transferred from one post 
to another for any reason.  In practice, however, this never occurs and it is universally 
acknowledged that the Council of State enjoys the same independence from executive-
branch meddling as do the courts. 
 Litigation in the Council of State is conceived in markedly different terms from 
litigation in the ordinary courts.  Traditionally, administrative litigation was understood 
primarily as designed to guarantee the legality and propriety of government action in a 
republican system faithful to the rule of law.  In other words, administrative litigation was 
perceived as serving “objective” purposes, linked to the correct working of the 
bureaucracy within the overall system of government.  Until recently, the “subjective” 
purposes of promoting justice and safeguarding individual rights were believed to be 
secondary.  This has had numerous consequences for the system of administrative law 
adjudication.  The fact that an administrative decision takes the form of a generally 
applicable regulation, affecting broad classes of individuals based on general 
characteristics, is not a barrier to getting into court (standing) as in other countries, such 
as Germany, England, and, in the past, the United States.  Because of the focus on the 
objective lawfulness of rules, any individual affected by a rule can come forward to 
contest its correctness.  Another consequence of this stylization of administrative 
adjudication was, until recently, a fairly meek system of judicial remedies.  Before 1980, 
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the Council of State could annul offending administrative acts but it did not have the 
procedural tools necessary to force administration to come into compliance and guarantee 
that victorious litigants would obtain relief from wrongful government action.  Since the 
1980s, however, the Council of State has gradually acquired a better remedial toolkit, 
first with the power to fine non-compliant administration (astreinte), then with the power 
to issue injunctions (injonction), and finally with the power to grant temporary 
injunctions (référé). 
Mirroring the institutional separation between the judiciary and the Council of 
State, the study and doctrinal elaboration of administrative law in France is marked by a 
self-conscious divide between public and private law.  In public law thinking, state 
administration is granted extraordinary privileges (the prerogatives of the puissance 
publique) but is also subject to extensive duties designed to safeguard the rights and 
interests of citizens.  One clear example of this is the important concept of “public 
service.”10  The notion of public service was invented to cover any state activity 
performed in the general interest, not simply the core functions of policing and defense.   
Once a government activity is classified as a “public service,” the state is empowered to 
take whatever measures are necessary to ensure the continuity of that service and 
adaptation to changing circumstances, but it is also under a duty to treat the citizen-users 
of the public service equally and neutrally.  To ensure continuity and adaptability, the 
administration is permitted to unilaterally modify government contracts with private 
providers but it is also required to compensate the provider for any loss suffered as a 
consequence.   
Linked to this understanding of the special concerns of public law is the sweeping 
scope of the field.  In contrast with common law systems like the United States, where 
public contracts and government liability are taught as specialty subjects and are omitted 
from most administrative law textbooks, in the French tradition, state liability and 
government contracts are integral to the discipline.  The theoretical apparatus of 
government privileges and duties at the core of administrative law extends to all forms of 
administrative action and all attempts to obtain individual redress from government 
wrongs.   As many have observed, however, public law is coming to borrow more and 
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more from private law and therefore, even in France, public contracts and governmental 
liability are losing some of their distinctiveness.
11
 
 An alternative that has emerged to the English and French models of judicial 
review is that of a specialized branch of the judiciary dedicated to hearing administrative 
law cases.
 12
  The first example is generally taken to be Germany. There the judicial 
branch is composed of the Federal Constitutional Court and five discrete judicial 
hierarchies, one for civil and criminal law, one for labor disputes, one for tax disputes, 
one for social security disputes, and one for administrative law disputes.  The latter three 
all handle variants of what would be called administrative law cases in other countries.  
The judges that serve on the tax, social security, and administrative law courts are 
recruited based on the same system of university study, exams, and traineeships as their 
counterparts on other courts and share the same, identical guarantee of independence.  
The only difference is the degree of specialization and familiarity that the members of 
these three branches acquire with administrative disputes.   
The systems in this third category operate closer to the common law model than 
the French one.  In Germany as well as other countries that have chosen to adopt a 
specialized judiciary, government contract and tort disputes are heard by the civil courts, 
not by the administrative courts, and the doctrine tracks the private law of contract and 
tort.  Moreover, administrative litigation is designed to protect individual rights and 
interests, much as private law litigation, and therefore the conditions under which 
standing is granted are more limited than in French law while, at the same time, the 
remedial powers of courts are broader. 
 Most legal systems have adopted one of these three institutional models.  
Histories of colonial rule can go some way in explaining the patterns that we see today. 
The territories that were part of the British Empire and that adopted the common law 
have entrusted generalist courts with hearing disputes between individuals and public 
administration.  These include Australia, New Zealand, India, Ireland, and the United 
States.  Due to the influence of American law after World War II, a number of other 
countries have adopted the generalist court model, including Japan and South Korea.  
Countries influenced by France in the 1800s and the first half of the 1900s today have 
Councils of State that operate separate from the judiciary.  These include Belgium, the 
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Netherlands, Luxembourg, Italy, Greece, Turkey, Lebanon, Egypt, Colombia, Morocco, 
Algeria, and Senegal.
13
  However, the label can be deceptive, since some of these 
Councils of State only have policymaking powers (e.g., Luxembourg) and some only 
have powers of adjudication and are housed within the generalist court of last resort for 
civil and criminal disputes (e.g., Morocco, Algeria, Senegal).   Moreover, unlike the 
French model, jurisdiction over government liability cases in Belgium, Italy, and the 
Netherlands is vested in the courts, not the Council of State, on the liberal theory that the 
ordinary courts are better placed to protect property and other rights against oppressive 
state action.  It appears that the system of a specialized, administrative law branch of the 
judiciary, illustrated above with the German case, is even more widespread that the other 
two models:  it has been adopted in Austria, Portugal, Sweden, Finland, Czech Republic, 
Poland , Spain, Switzerland, Hungary, Slovenia, Romania, Estonia, and most of Latin 
America.   
 
3.2.  Principles of administrative action 
3.2.1.  Procedural principles 
Traditionally, one of the differences that separated the common law from 
continental legal systems was its reliance on procedural principles of fair play in judging 
the correctness of administrative action.
 14
  The common law tended to equate important 
categories of administrative action with the adjudication of courts and to require 
analogous procedural safeguards.  By contrast, the administrative law of continental 
Europe was more focused on the substantive correctness of administrative decisions in 
deciding whether to let them stand.
15
  In English law, this procedural emphasis was 
encapsulated by the principle of natural justice, which included the right to be heard and 
the right to an impartial adjudicator, also known as the rule against bias.  In American 
law, these same guarantees have been developed in the constitutional case law on 
procedural due process.  Although the French Council of State began fashioning 
procedural requirements for government administration as far back as 1944, with a line of 
cases on the “rights of the defense” (droits de la défense), these rights were more limited 
than their common law counterparts:  they generally excluded rights to an oral hearing 
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and the disclosure of documents and they only applied to those administrative decisions 
that were cast as imposing sanctions. 
Since the 1970s, however, this common law-continental law difference has faded. 
A number of national laws guarantee individuals, in the context of an individualized 
administrative determination, the right to receive notice of the proposed decision, to 
examine the supporting documents, to respond in writing, and to receive a statement of 
reasons with the final decision.  These include French laws of July 11, 1979 and April 12, 
2000, the Italian law of August 7, 1990, the Swedish Administrative Procedure Act of 
1986, and the Danish Public Administration Act of 1985.  The German case is somewhat 
exceptional in that the proceduralization of individual decisionmaking began immediately 
in the post-war period, under the heavy influence of constitutional law, and was 
eventually codified with the Federal Administrative Procedure Act of 1977.  Spain is 
another interesting case:  Already in 1889, notice and hearing procedures for licensing, 
procurement, and other types of individualized decisions were set down in the Spanish 
Administrative Procedure Act.   A number of countries in Latin America and East Asia 
have also adopted administrative procedure laws:   Peru in 1972, Argentina in 1973, 
Costa Rica in 1978, Columbia in 1984, Japan in 1993, and South Korea in 1995.
16
   
 Notwithstanding this common trend, at least one important difference remains.  
Common law countries have institutionalized the judicial model within the administrative 
process to a greater extent than other legal systems.   In Britain and Australia this takes 
the shape of administrative tribunals, while in the United States it comes under the 
heading of “formal adjudication,” governed by the Administrative Procedure Act and 
handled by administrative law judges.
17
  Administrative tribunals and administrative law 
judges are responsible for hearing appeals from social security determinations, 
immigration decisions, and other high-volume regulatory areas and their decisions are 
subject to judicial review on points of law before the ordinary courts.  They are formally 
part of government administration even though they enjoy significant statutory 
guarantees of independence and their decisionmaking procedure is modeled after the 
courtroom.  This institutionalization of dispute resolution stands in contrast with 
continental bureaucracies, where there is generally a right of appeal up the chain-of-
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command to administrative superiors, but where the main opportunity for an independent 
hearing is in judicial review before a full-fledged court.   
 
3.2.2. Substantive principles 
In reviewing the substance of an administrative decision to ban a product on 
safety grounds, to deny a building permit for a supermarket, or to accomplish one of the 
thousands of other purposes of bureaucracy, what criteria do courts use?
18
  A multitude of 
doctrinal headings are used by courts to examine the substance of administrative 
decisions and decide whether or not to let them stand.  Nevertheless, the intervention of 
courts in the activity of bureaucracy can be seen to fall under three distinct headings:  rule 
of law, individual rights, and policy rationality.  In the section below, I explore the local 
expressions of these judicial review practices and discuss the important variations in how 
and the extent to which these powers are exercised. 
Much judicial review is geared towards furthering the rule of law, understood as 
the principle of a government of laws and not of men.
19
  Public administration must 
respect the purposes and limits set down in laws—generally passed by parliaments, but 
also, in some places executive decrees—or turn into the arbitrary action of  tyrannical 
despots.   The task of courts is to enforce those limits.  To understand the pervasiveness 
of this understanding of the relationship between courts and the bureaucracy, it suffices to 
peruse the main types of challenges contemplated in the administrative law of France, the 
United States, and England.  Administrative acts can be overturned in France in the case 
of “incompetence” or a “violation of the law,”20 in the United States, if they are “in 
excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right”21 and 
in England if the court finds an “error of law”22 or “illegality.”23  Thus to take an example 
from American administrative law, in 2000, the Supreme Court struck a regulation of the 
Food and Drug Administration severely restricting the sale and advertising of tobacco 
products on the grounds that the statute under which the government was acting could 
only be interpreted to give it authority over medical drugs, not tobacco.
24
  The same 
challenge would be styled as incompetence or a violation of law in France and an error of 
law or illegality in England.  
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 A second type of substantive review of administrative action is the protection of 
basic liberties against government action.  This was true even in the absence of a written 
bill of rights enforceable by the courts, as was the case in most countries until the 1950s, 
given the importance of property rights in both the common law and civil law codes.  
With the spread of written constitutions in the twentieth century, as well as international 
human rights instruments, in particular the European Convention of Human Rights, the 
catalogue of rights that courts are expected to defend against administrative action has 
expanded: freedom of expression and association, the right to privacy and human dignity, 
personal liberty, the right to engage in the trades, and much more.  All of these rights can 
be readily breached by the decisions of immigration authorities, social security agencies, 
licensing boards, and other government bodies and they are commonly invoked before 
the courts. 
On this aspect of judicial review, let us dwell on Germany for a moment, where 
fundamental rights guarantees are particularly pervasive and administrative law has been 
thoroughly constitutionalized, more so than in other European systems and the United 
States.  The most conspicuous sign of this is probably the declaration, made in 1959 by 
the President of the Federal Administrative Court, that administrative law is “concretised 
constitutional law” (konkretisiertes Verfassungsrecht).26  The German courts have 
developed a number of cross-cutting principles that are designed to limit administrative 
action to the benefit of individual liberties.  Three in particular bear mention:  
proportionality, equality, and legitimate expectations.   
Any measure that interferes with a right must satisfy a proportionality test.  In this 
sequential inquiry, the government must demonstrate that the measure is capable of 
achieving the declared public ends; that it is necessary to achieve those ends and that no 
other, equally effective and less rights-restrictive measures are available for 
accomplishing the same purposes; and that the public benefit from the measure outweighs 
the burden to the individual right.  Thus, for instance, in the domain of administrative 
sanctions, the Federal Constitutional Court has held that the forfeiture of unemployment 
benefits for two weeks, in response to the recipient’s failure to notify regularly the public 
employment office of his employment status, was disproportionate.  To take another 
example, in 1958, the Constitutional Court declared a restriction on the number of 
 14 
pharmacies a disproportionate interference with the right to freely choose one’s 
profession.  The German courts engage in a similar inquiry when administrative 
programs are challenged due to alleged discrimination based on economic or other 
characteristics:  under the equality principle “[d]ifferences must be of such a kind and 
weight so as to justify a differentiation.”27  And the principle of legitimate expectations, 
the rough equivalent of the duty of non-retroactivity and the protection of reliance 
interests in the United States, and derived in Germany from the rule of law and the right 
to freedom of action, significantly limits the ability of public administration to reverse 
benefit-conferring determinations.  As a result of this legal doctrine, beneficiaries of 
public programs involving agricultural subsidies, housing benefits, and other types of 
entitlements have a right to significant notice (generally one year) or compensation 
before the government may alter the terms of the program or withdraw a benefit 
improperly granted.
28
   
These rights, albeit with numerous modifications and with significant differences 
in judicial practice, have gone on to influence the case law of the European Court of 
Justice and other European legal systems.
29
  The constitutionalization of European 
administrative law stands in marked contrast with the United States, where the Supreme 
Court is highly deferential to government action that burdens the economic rights 
protected under the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution.
30
  These are the very 
rights that are most commonly implicated by administrative determinations yet so-called 
“rational basis” review under the Fourteenth Amendment is a tremendously lenient 
standard when compared to the principles of proportionality and equality in German law.   
The last form of judicial review of administrative action is review for policy 
rationality. Doctrinally, rationality review picks up where legality review leaves off:   
when controlling legislation does not contain standards to guide administrative action and 
thus effectively leaves decisionmaking to bureaucratic discretion, the courts nonetheless 
can evaluate administrative action based on criteria related to sound policymaking.  
Doctrinal expressions of this form of review give the impression that only acts of 
confirmed insanity will be struck by the courts:  review for “arbitrary and capricious” 
decisionmaking in the United States
31
 and review for “manifest error of assessment” 
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(erreur manifeste d’appréciation) in France.32   Even better is the English articulation of 
the principle:   
 
By “irrationality” I mean what can now be succinctly referred to 
“Wednesbury unreasonableness”....  It applies to a decision which is so 
outrageous in its defiance of logic or accepted moral standards that no 
sensible person who had applied his mind to the question to be decided 
could have arrived at it....
33
 
 
In the United States, however, arbitrary and capricious review has become a 
demanding test, and, indeed, it has come to represent a distinctive feature of the 
American administrative law system.  It became common judicial practice in the late 
1960s and the 1970s and was associated with the fall of the post-war consensus on 
economic growth, growing distrust in technologies and government, new social 
movements such as the environment and civil rights, and the spread of public interest 
lawyering.  The Supreme Court’s statement in State Farm remains the emblematic 
articulation of arbitrary and capricious review of administrative policymaking in 
American law: 
 
the agency must examine the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory 
explanation for its action including a ‘rational connection between the 
facts found and the choice made.’ . . . Normally, an agency rule would be 
arbitrary and capricious if the agency has relied on factors which Congress 
has not intended it to consider, entirely failed to consider an important 
aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs 
counter to the evidence before the agency or is so implausible that it could 
not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise. . 
. . 
34
   
In State Farm, the Supreme Court struck an administrative decision revoking a 
passenger-safety rule requiring automobiles to be fitted with automatic seatbelts or 
airbags.  It found that the tests and studies in the agency’s record did not support a 
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determination that the rule would fail to produce safety benefits and it faulted the agency 
for failing to consider other policy options for ensuring passenger safety, namely an 
airbag-only rule.   
Although European rights-based proportionality review and American arbitrary 
and capricious review overlap in some respects, their essence is fundamentally different.  
In the former, the focus is on the individual right and the decision to overturn the 
administrative act turns on an assessment of the importance of the right as compared to 
the public purpose as well as the ability of the administration to articulate a close 
connection between the government measure and the public purpose.  In the latter, the 
focus is on the quality of the science and policymaking assessments behind the 
administrative decision and the ability of the government to justify its chosen course of 
action in the face of alternative scientific evidence and policy options put forward by its 
opponents.    
 
4. Administration and Organized Interests 
 In the conventional image of public administration, bureaucrats and courts are the 
main protagonists.  State officials deploy their considerable expertise and technical 
prowess to accomplish public purposes and courts watch over them to ensure that they 
stay within the four corners of the law.  The role of social and economic groups in 
administrative governance has traditionally been ignored in legal scholarship, largely 
because the theories of democracies used to legitimate administration cast elections, 
representative assemblies, and independent courts as the primary agents of democracy 
and tend to regard interest groups with suspicion.  
A growing literature, however, now recognizes that many elements of 
administrative law are designed to enable social and economic actors to inform and 
participate in administrative governance and that the legitimacy of administration rests as 
much on accountability to civil society as it does on judicial review and legislative 
oversight.
35
  Industry associations, trade unions, professional associations, environmental 
and consumer groups, and various other actors are routinely called upon to advise on 
government rulemaking, manage public programs, and engage directly in standard-setting 
and rule-enforcement through powers of self-regulation.   Due to space constraints, this 
 17 
section will address only one of these forms of administrative law: the procedures that 
empower social and economic groups to participate in government rulemaking. 
A distinctive feature of American administrative law is what is known as notice-
and-comment rulemaking.  Before administrative agencies decide on the new policies 
contained in government rules—for instance, worker-safety standards for coal mines, 
maximum chemical concentrations for drinking water, and consumer protection rules for 
the banking industry—they must first give notice of the proposed rule, allow the public 
an opportunity to comment on the rule, and respond to any objections in a “concise 
general statement” explaining the rationale for the rule.36  If commenters are disappointed 
with the final result, they may go to court.  Besides reviewing the rule on the substantive 
grounds discussed in the previous section, the court will also decide whether the agency 
adequately responded to the public comments or, if no such procedure was held, whether 
the administration was correct in deciding that one of the exceptions to the requirement of 
notice-and-comment rulemaking applied.  Thus notice-and-comment rulemaking 
significantly limits administrative discretion, both on when and whom to consult and on 
what weight, if any, to give to objections from the regulated community.  Although 
notice-and-comment rulemaking is formally open to anyone, a number of studies have 
found that, in practice, organized interests and market actors are the main participants, 
both because of the resources necessary to respond convincingly to administrative 
proposals and, in the event of defeat, call the administration to task before the courts, and 
because of the broad-reaching and abstract nature of the policy being decided, which 
rarely prompts action from individual citizens.
37
   
Notice-and-comment rulemaking was first introduced in 1946, with the adoption 
of the Administrative Procedure Act.  It was then amplified in the 1960s and 1970s by a 
series of court decisions that required administration to alert the public to all aspects of a 
proposed rule and to give careful consideration to public comments in the administrative 
statement supporting the final rule.
38
  This judicial turn was driven by the sense that 
administration had been “captured” by industry actors and that public interest groups, 
which were rapidly proliferating at the time, should be guaranteed an equally prominent 
role in the policymaking process.
 39
  The original creation and subsequent development of 
notice-and-comment rulemaking reflects what, in the political science literature, is known 
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as the American system of pluralist interest representation.
40
  In the theoretical stylization 
of pluralism, multiple organizations, representing a variety of different interests, compete 
to influence government decisions in what, formally speaking, is a policymaking process 
open to all and government officials seek to neutrally mediate among these diverse 
interests.  Pluralist thinkers like Arthur Bentley, David Truman, and Robert Dahl saw 
immense democratic promise in this system of interest group competition because they 
believed that government decisions would reflect the entire range of interests at play in 
the nation rather than cater to any one group or set of groups.  Of course, as many have 
observed, this positive assessment rests on a number of often questionable assumptions— 
that all groups are equally capable of mobilizing, that all organizations have the resources 
necessary to participate in the political process, and that government officials 
mechanically responding to self-regarding interests, even a wide variety of interests, is a 
process capable of generating morally worthy government policies.
41
   Nevertheless, the 
theory and practice of pluralism is extremely powerful in American politics and is 
reflected and perpetuated by legal procedures such as notice-and-comment rulemaking.  
By contrast, in Europe, the favorite device for obtaining outside advice on 
government rules is the civil society committee.  Established by law, these committees 
are composed of representatives of the major organizations active in the policy area and 
are generally chaired by a government bureaucrat.  Their consultation can be either 
mandatory or optional, depending on the policy area and the type of government 
proposal, and they often also exercise powers of proposal.  In France, Italy, the European 
Union, and other legal systems, there are hundreds of these committees in areas as 
diverse as welfare and industrial policy, consumer policy, environmental policy, and 
equal protection.  To give but one example, in France, the High Council on Professional 
Equality Between Men and Women gives advice on new equal protection initiatives and 
is composed of nine members of the administration, nine members selected by the five 
major national trade unions, nine members chosen by a variety of employer 
organizations, and nine policy experts and representatives of women’s rights 
organizations selected by the responsible government ministry.  In committees such as 
the French High Council, the organizations entitled to comment on government policies 
are the handful mentioned in the enabling legislation or tapped by the administration to 
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sit on the committee, and therefore influence over policymaking is more restricted than in 
notice-and-comment rulemaking, as it is limited to those groups that have established 
themselves as reputable and powerful members of the regulatory community.  Moreover, 
unlike notice-and-comment rulemaking, which is mandatory for most forms of 
administrative rulemaking, consultation of civil society committees is often entirely 
within the discretion of public administration.  And finally, while American officials 
must reply meticulously to comments or risk being sued, their European counterparts are 
not legally required to respond in any particular fashion to the comments and proposals 
authored by such committees.      
It is certainly true that, today, European regulators also stage broad-based 
consultations, using the possibilities afforded by the internet to make their policy 
proposals widely known and to solicit the reactions of all those organizations that care to 
comment.
 42
  Therefore the privileged access of the past through the committee system 
has been attenuated somewhat through the use of new technologies.  However, in contrast 
with American notice-and-comment rulemaking, these consultations are permeated by 
administrative discretion, both in the decision to call them in the first place and 
subsequently, in the decision on what kind of response, if any, to give to public 
opposition.  Regulators, therefore, are still in a strong position to control access to the 
policymaking process.   
The institution of the civil society committee is rooted in the theory and politics of 
what, in the political science literature, is known as neo-corporatism.
43
  In many 
European countries, producer groups are represented by a few, all-encompassing and 
broadly representative labor unions, employer associations, farmer groups, and 
professional associations and these organizations are given an essential role in the 
policymaking process.  As politics have changed and non-material interests have become 
more prominent, this model of all-encompassing organizations and privileged access has 
been extended to environmental and consumer protection groups, human rights 
organizations, and other types of associations.  Neo-corporatist political theory portrayed 
the state and society as intertwined:  public administration would nurture the many 
producer organizations upon which social cohesion and economic prosperity depended 
and, in turn, those producer groups would be entitled to influence the policies of the state.  
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These ideas were developed in the law by thinkers such as Harold Laski in England, Otto 
von Gierke in Germany, Léon Duguit and Maurice Hauriou in France, and Santi Romano 
in Italy and stand in marked contrast with the portrayal of interest group politics as 
conflictual and government actors as passive arbiters in pluralist theories of democracy.   
 
5. Administration and the Public 
 In a number of administrative law systems, informal, broad-ranging public 
oversight has become critical to the legitimacy of bureaucracy.  Although this form of 
diffuse accountability is achieved through a wide range of legal tools and institutional 
arrangements, two are particularly prominent: ombudsmen appointed by parliaments with 
oversight and complaint-resolution functions and laws guaranteeing all citizens a right of 
access to government documents.  Sweden is generally believed to be the first Western 
legal system to have established an ombudsman and freedom of information.  There the 
expansion of parliamentary power and the establishment of a constitutional monarchy 
was accompanied by the passage of the Law on Liberty of the Press (1766, re-enacted in 
1809), abolishing censorship and giving a right of public access to government 
documents, and the creation of a parliamentary ombudsman (1809).  For a long time, 
Sweden stood out as an anomaly, but beginning in the 1970s, momentum got underway 
in a number of countries for broader public accountability in government administration 
and today a vast array of legal systems have freedom-of-information laws and 
ombudsmen.   
 Ombudsmen share a number of characteristics.
44
  They are institutionally linked 
to parliaments, not the executive branch, by virtue of the fact that they are appointed by 
parliament, generally for a fixed term, and are legally obligated to report periodically to 
parliament on their activities.  The principal function of ombudsmen is to settle 
complaints filed by members of the public against the bureaucracy.  The process is 
informal, in that a simple letter or online complaint form is sufficient to trigger an 
investigation and the grounds for complaining are extremely broad—anything linked to 
maladministration—and do not need to be styled as one of the grounds for obtaining legal 
redress in the courts.  “The public officer was extremely rude” or “I never received an 
answer to the query that I filed with the tax office” is enough to warrant a response from 
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the ombudsman.
45
   The ombudsman system, therefore, offers the promise of redress to 
individuals without the resources to go to court and in circumstances that fail to meet the 
stringent legal criteria that have been developed by courts to make a successful claim 
against the administration.   
Once the ombudsman comes to a decision on a complaint, the powers of the 
office are limited compared to courts.  The ombudsman cannot order civil servants to 
comply with his or her decision but rather must rely on bureaucratic good will and the 
threat of bad press and public embarrassment to induce compliance.
46
  The triangular 
relationship between the ombudsman, the press, and parliament is critical to ensuring the 
effectiveness of the institution.  The threat of public censure and hostile parliamentary 
questions is the main tool in the ombudsman’s arsenal and underscores the diffuse public 
accountability inherent in this area of administrative law.  Ombudsmen in Sweden, 
France, Denmark and many other countries are also involved in policymaking and 
regularly recommend changes to administrative law and practice to bring administration 
into line with rule of law ideals and fundamental rights guarantees. 
 Laws on the right of access to public documents also broaden public oversight of 
administration.
47
   The right to government documents expands public scrutiny by giving 
individuals a right to examine the decisions of government even absent a claim of having 
been wronged or having a particular interest in the matter.  Simply by virtue of being a 
citizen, individuals are assumed to have a stake in the correct workings of their 
government and are entitled to request government documents without having to put 
forward a justification for their request.   Freedom-of-information laws, however, also 
restrict the types of documents that are accessible.  For instance, documents filed with 
government by industry and containing commercial secrets and documents related to 
national security are either excluded from the right of access or subject to extensive 
redaction before they may be released to the public.  Preliminary drafts, notes, and 
memoranda are entirely exempted from disclosure in Sweden and Denmark if they are 
not circulated outside the responsible government agency and are exempted until the 
relevant government decision becomes final in Finland and the United States.   These 
laws also differ in how they organize access to documents:  an official register of 
government documents, open to public consultation, exists in Sweden, Finland, and the 
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European Union, but not in Denmark, the Netherlands, and the United States, where 
petitioners must designate the issue of interest and trust the responding agency to locate 
the relevant documents. 
 Both ombudsmen and freedom-of-information laws have been popular over the 
past decades.  In Europe, Finland (1919), Denmark (1954), Britain (1967), France (1973), 
Spain (1981), the Netherlands (1984), Ireland (1984), Portugal (1991), and Romania 
(1991) have established ombudsmen at the national level, and other countries, like 
Germany and Italy, have established them at the regional level.   New Zealand (1962), 
Hong Kong (1989), and Korea (1994) are examples of other countries with parliamentary 
ombudsmen.   As for freedom of information, according to one study, almost seventy 
countries throughout the world have adopted the necessary legislation.
48
   
These overviews give an idea not only of the extent of diffuse public 
accountability as a feature of administrative law, but also of the remaining variations.  
Legal systems still differ in the degree to which individuals seek formal recognition of 
their grievances through the courts or rely mostly on informal avenues of redress through 
ombudsmen.  In some countries, parliamentary ombudsmen are absent, as in the United 
States and Germany (at the federal level), and in others, the ombudsman system is 
considered ineffective.  By contrast, in countries like Sweden and Denmark, the informal 
administrative justice offered by ombudsmen is immensely popular and tends to function 
as a substitute for courts.  Freedom-of-information laws also have not taken root 
everywhere.  Just in Europe, Italy and Greece are notable exceptions to the trend.  
 
6. The Globalization of Administrative Law 
 This discussion would be incomplete without mention of the accelerating 
diffusion of administrative principles among legal systems, spurred by the forces of 
globalization.  Traditionally one of the reasons that public law was said to be the poor 
cousin of private law in comparative studies was that public law was too idiosyncratic 
and contingent on domestic politics and national history for comparison to yield any 
fruitful insights.  There is no doubt that administrative law is profoundly shaped by 
distinct national experiences with state formation.  Today, however, the rise of a liberal 
consensus and the growing power of international organizations have prompted political 
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actors in a variety of jurisdictions to adopt a common set of good governance reforms 
involving administrative procedures and principles of judicial review.  Therefore, at least 
on the books, administrative law appears to be converging.     
Transparency, where the last section ended, is a good example of the globalization 
phenomenon.  As explained earlier, legislation on the right of access to government 
documents was first adopted in Sweden in 1766 and it was immediately copied in 
Finland, which at the time was a Swedish colony.  Two hundred years later, it still was 
limited to those two countries.  Then, in the 1970s and 1980s, the United States and a 
handful of other European countries adopted freedom-of-information legislation.   In 
1993, the European Union followed suit, obliging not only its own institutions to hand 
over documents to the public, but also putting heavy pressure on all of its member 
countries to do the same.  Since then, the United Nations, the Organization of American 
States, and a number of other international organizations have urged their member 
countries to adopt freedom-of-information laws.  By 2006, one survey found that nearly 
seventy countries had such laws and an additional fifty countries were in the process of 
drafting them.
49
  And according to a recent analysis, the many transnational and 
international regulatory authorities that have sprung up over the past decades also have 
made commitments to transparency.
50
  In sum, since the 1990s, the right of access to 
government documents has become a commonplace of public life and this is due in no 
small measure to the growing influence of international bodies in world politics.   
One of the main challenges facing comparative law scholars today is to 
understand the operation, utility, and ultimately, desirability of these common procedures 
and principles in the multiple legal settings in which they now exist.  To do so, it is 
necessary for comparative scholarship to move beyond the traditional national focus and 
to recognize the growing importance of international legal systems as objects of study in 
their own right and as catalysts for change at the domestic level.   At bottom, however, 
comparative law is well equipped to handle this new task.   It requires a deep appreciation 
of the historical diversity of national legal traditions and a familiarity with the many ways 
in which legal transplants can be transformed in the process of migration from one place 
to another.  These are concerns that have traditionally been at the heart of comparative 
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law scholarship and that offer an essential platform for coming to grips with 
globalization. 
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